Bribes, Gratuities… and Passing the Buck

By Michael Johnston, Colgate University (Emeritus) & Oguzhan Dincer, Department of Economics, Illinois State University

The United States is facing an emerging corruption problem that so far has drawn relatively little notice. Relying primarily upon federal prosecutors to check state and local corruption has always been a questionable strategy, and it is now about to become even less of a deterrent. Here’s why:

Criminal prosecution

Cautionary tale #1: Bribes to a public official may be framed as gratuities, thus increasing reliance on state statutes for anti-corruption enforcement

On June 26, 2024, in the midst of a presidential election campaign that was dominating the news, the U.S. Supreme Court issued a ruling in the case of Snyder v. United States. In 2013, while James Snyder was mayor of the city of Portage, Indiana, the city purchased five trash trucks from a local company, Great Lakes Peterbilt, for about $1.1 million. The next year, Peterbilt paid Snyder $13,000, which Snyder said was for his consulting services as a contractor for Peterbilt. A federal jury, however, convicted Snyder of accepting an illegal gratuity in violation of Section 666 of Title 18 of the United States Code; as a result, the District Court sentenced Snyder to nineteen months in prison. The Seventh Circuit, US Court of Appeals, agreed; but by a 6-3 vote, the high court accepted Snyder’s argument that while Section 666 prohibits bribes made by prior arrangement to state and local officials, it allows them to accept ‘gratuities’ for their past acts. The Court’s decision significantly narrowed the scope of federal corruption statutes, holding that regulation of gratuities falls to state and local governments.

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That is a development of potentially great importance. In the United States, nearly all prosecutions for public corruption have occurred at the federal level, even though most of the defendants in these cases are officials at the state and local levels of government. Only about five percent of all corruption cases are tried outside the federal courts.

Cautionary tale #2: High costs and partisan bias can be factors in prosecuting a corrupt public official

Making matters worse even given the powers and resources of the federal government, convicting a corrupt public official is a difficult and expensive process. Illinois Governor Rod Blagojevich’s corruption trials began with charges made by a federal prosecutor in 2008 after a five-year investigation. Blagojevich was impeached and removed from office by the state legislature, but his first federal trial culminated in August 2010 with a mistrial due to a hung jury on all counts but one: lying to federal investigators. He was tried again and, in June 2011, convicted on eighteen charges, including attempted extortion, conspiracy to solicit bribes, and wire fraud. In December 2011, he was sentenced to fourteen years in federal prison. The case — fraught with political complexities as charges against Blagojevic included soliciting payments for nomination to the U.S. Senate seat being vacated by President-elect Barack Obama — was one of the most expensive corruption cases in U.S. history, with estimates ranging from several million to $30 million. Echoes of the case have continued: in early 2020, President Donald Trump commuted the prison sentence, and Blagojevich was released after serving eight years. Then, on February 10, 2025, Trump pardoned Blagojevich, who thus is no longer considered guilty.

"The U.S. Supreme Court is deregulating corruption, with arguably grim consequences for American Democracy." (The Kentucky Lantern)

Cautionary tale #3: Partisan bias can arise in the prosecution of public officials by U.S. District Attorneys

Partisan bias has frequently become an issue in the prosecution of public officials by U.S. District Attorneys. They are, after all, appointed by the President with the advice and support of home-state partisans. Anecdotal as well as empirical evidence supports the partisan-bias hypothesis: the unprecedented midterm dismissal of seven U.S. attorneys by the Bush administration in 2007, for example, led to congressional investigations. Some were allegedly dismissed either because they did not pursue corruption investigations against prominent Democrats with sufficient vigor, or because they did go after prominent Republicans. Using data from public corruption prosecutions, Gordon finds evidence of partisan bias under both the Bush and Clinton Justice Departments. In the wake of Snyder, it is reasonable to expect fewer prosecutions for corruption across the board. Not only will some of what most would see as bribes be portrayed as gratuities, particularly when those making payments hold onto their money until after favorable outcomes have been delivered, but –– equally important –– because most states lack the resources available to most U.S. District Attorneys. Moreover, top state officials such as governors are likely considerably more influential within their states than they are at the federal level. Given Donald Trump’s political instincts, his eventual appointees as U.S. Attorneys, and the loyalties of many of his followers in the states, we might well see fewer corruption prosecutions in red states, and intensified prosecutions of both gratuities and conventional bribery allegations — still a federal crime under Section 666 –– in blue states.

But what about elections — and the media?

Criminal prosecutions are not the only deterrent to corruption: for corrupt elected officials at all levels, losing an election is the most immediate form of punishment. But to function as an effective deterrent, that requires that voters participate in elections and be well informed about the corrupt dealings of the politicians. Ideally the media — seen by many as the fourth branch of government — not only uncover corruption and empower voters by informing them, but also deter it by making electoral defeat a significant threat to corrupt politicians. But particularly at the state and local levels, journalistic oversight has been markedly weakened by technological, cultural and economic changes. Empirical evidence suggests, for example, that in cities that have lost a local newspaper, local governments’ budgetary and fiscal management significantly declines in quality.

But in our recently published book, Corruption in America: A Fifty-Ring Circus, we use data from the fifty states — since Snyder, about to become even more important to corruption and reform in the United States — to show that voter participation reduces corruption only where media cover the corrupt dealings of the politicians and officials effectively. If media coverage is poor, or absent — if it does not reveal how corrupt a state and its local governments are, voter participation causes corruption to increase. The lack of coverage makes it easier for a corrupt politician to stay in public office because they have more resources during elections — including the power of incumbency itself — and they are able to mobilize voters with incentives and get away with it. A more general related problem is that of declining public trust in political leaders, the press, and among citizens. The result of all of the factors discussed in this blog is that even clear-cut evidence of corruption may well be dismissed by a significant portion of the public as nothing more than the usual political mud fight.

Closing thoughts

Greater reliance upon the states in checking corruption may sound like a democratic development. State governments are closer to the people, the argument might run, and will therefore do a better job of bringing citizen values and expectations to bear upon politicians and officials. But that is a dubious premise: state political systems are more likely to be dominated, and their prosecutors influenced, by state-level parties, political figures and economic interests. Moreover, as we show in our book, the states have political cultures of their own — long-standing and distinctive value systems — and those factors too will shape the working definition of corruption and notions of accountability. If the states are indeed to become even more important players in terms of corruption control, citizens and businesses in many parts of the country who seek honest and accountable government may well be in for a very rough ride.

Michael Johnston (Ph. D. Yale University, 1977) is the Charles A. Dana Professor of Political Science Emeritus at Colgate University. From January 2017 through May 2019, he was a Distinguished Professor at the International Anti-Corruption Academy in Laxenburg, Austria. His most recent book, The Conundrum of Corruption: Reform for Social Justice (co-author Scott A. Fritzen), was published by Routledge in December, 2020. Transitions to Good Governance (Edward Elgar; co-edited with Alina Mungiu-Pippidi) appeared in 2017. Syndromes of Corruption: Wealth, Power, and Democracy (Cambridge University Press, 2005) won the 2009 Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order, presented by the University of Louisville. He has served as a consultant to numerous international organizations, and between 2009 and 2014 was involved in long-term reform efforts in the Philippines. In recent years he has prepared a review of issues in measuring corruption and governance for the World Bank, developed an analysis of connections between corruption and political instability for a US Government agency, and presented a lecture and chaired a panel discussion at the OECD in Paris. In 2016 he was a member of a team organized by the University of Southern California that conducted a mid-term evaluation of the Open Government Partnership. Current projects include helping develop typologies of corruption risks for the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency of the World Bank. He lives in suburban Austin, Texas, with his wife, Betsy, who will likely re-introduce cats to the household within the coming year. How long they will let us continue to live in their house remains to be seen.

Oguzhan Dincer (Ph. D. University of Oregon, 2004) is a Professor of Economics and the Founding Director of the Institute for Corruption Studies at Illinois State University. He published extensively on the causes and consequences of corruption. While he was a research fellow at the Corruption Lab which was founded by Larry Lessig at Harvard Law School’s Edmond J. Safra Center for Ethics, he worked on the measurement of different forms of corruption at different levels of government in the U.S. He is currently working on issues related to transnational corruption with a specific focus on Turkey. He lives in suburban Chicago, Illinois with his wife and two daughters – one of them is adopted and has four legs.